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endymions_bower“The things that come after the principle are not, in the straightforward sense, ‘all things’, but rather <all things> aside from the principle. Moreover, ‘all things’ would seem to be many delimited things; for infinite things would not exactly be all things. Totality is a certain boundary and even a comprehension, in which the principle is the upper limit, and that which is last from the principle the lower limit; all things are therefore together with <their> limits… the cause is coordinate with the things caused… and the one coordination of the many beings, this we call ‘all things’, so that the principle is also among all things… we call ‘all things’ whatever we conceive in any fashion, and we conceive the principle, too…” (1.10-2.6)
“But if all things are together with the principle, the principle will be no one of all things, lest the principle be included in all things; the one coordination of all things, therefore, which we call ‘all things’, is without principle [anarchos] and without cause [anaitios], lest we proceed to infinity. But the All [or ‘everything’, pan] must either be principle or from principle; and all things [panta] thus are either principle or from principle” (2.9-14).
Note the inference here from pan to panta—if each thing individually is either a principle or from a principle, then all things together are one or the other. But that forces the conclusion that either everything is a principle or nothing is. But one must be able to infer from individual essential characters to collective determinations if there is a genuine principle of totality; but we cannot, therefore there is not.
“But if the latter [viz., all things are from a principle] the principle would not be among all things, but outside all things, as the principle of the things from itself…” This works with particular sets, but leads to an absolutely nonexistent first principle, as we see below.
“…and if the former [viz., all things are principles/the principle], what would proceed from all things as from a principle and out from all things to the lowest as the product of all things? All things are thus neither principle nor from principle” (2.19-20).
Nothing is the product of all things, and nothing is the cause of all things. The All has no one decidable character; all things are locally determined: “All things are seen at once in some sort of manifold and in a certain determination, and we do not conceive the All without these” (2.21-22).
“When we simplify our total conception unto all things, then we do not categorize all things in the same way, but in at least three, in a unitary mode and in a unified mode and in a pluralized mode” (3.14-17). Three totalities with coordinate principles: the totality of henads (unitary totality of individuals in each of whom everything subsists); the totality of unified entities (the totality of holistically-relationally determined, i.e., passively unified entities); the pluralized or intellective totality of universals and particulars. Each of these is indeed the totality, but also really incapable of reducing the others.
4.13-18: “Our soul divines there to be of all things however conceived a principle beyond all things, uncoordinated with all things. One must therefore call that principle neither cause, nor first, nor indeed prior to all things, nor beyond all things; hardly thus must one declare it <to be> all things, nor must one declare it, conceive it, or conjecture it at all.”
@proclusberlin: the totality of intellect can't be reduced to the totality of unified things?
It seems not, though Damascius is probably not entirely consistent in this judgment; I'd say it's a consequence of his "upgrading" the status of intellect. Alternatively, one could say that it is a function of the almost para-intelligible status of the Unified as ontôs on. Note that Damascius posits theological coordinates both for the third moment of the 1st intelligible triad and for the third triad. He also seems to find a distinct agency in the intelligible object, a desire-to-be-known which (ironically?) may prevent seamless knowledge of it by the intellect.
“But if all things are together with the principle, the principle will be no one of all things, lest the principle be included in all things; the one coordination of all things, therefore, which we call ‘all things’, is without principle [anarchos] and without cause [anaitios], lest we proceed to infinity. But the All [or ‘everything’, pan] must either be principle or from principle; and all things [panta] thus are either principle or from principle” (2.9-14).
Note the inference here from pan to panta—if each thing individually is either a principle or from a principle, then all things together are one or the other. But that forces the conclusion that either everything is a principle or nothing is. But one must be able to infer from individual essential characters to collective determinations if there is a genuine principle of totality; but we cannot, therefore there is not.
“But if the latter [viz., all things are from a principle] the principle would not be among all things, but outside all things, as the principle of the things from itself…” This works with particular sets, but leads to an absolutely nonexistent first principle, as we see below.
“…and if the former [viz., all things are principles/the principle], what would proceed from all things as from a principle and out from all things to the lowest as the product of all things? All things are thus neither principle nor from principle” (2.19-20).
Nothing is the product of all things, and nothing is the cause of all things. The All has no one decidable character; all things are locally determined: “All things are seen at once in some sort of manifold and in a certain determination, and we do not conceive the All without these” (2.21-22).
“When we simplify our total conception unto all things, then we do not categorize all things in the same way, but in at least three, in a unitary mode and in a unified mode and in a pluralized mode” (3.14-17). Three totalities with coordinate principles: the totality of henads (unitary totality of individuals in each of whom everything subsists); the totality of unified entities (the totality of holistically-relationally determined, i.e., passively unified entities); the pluralized or intellective totality of universals and particulars. Each of these is indeed the totality, but also really incapable of reducing the others.
4.13-18: “Our soul divines there to be of all things however conceived a principle beyond all things, uncoordinated with all things. One must therefore call that principle neither cause, nor first, nor indeed prior to all things, nor beyond all things; hardly thus must one declare it <to be> all things, nor must one declare it, conceive it, or conjecture it at all.”
@proclusberlin: the totality of intellect can't be reduced to the totality of unified things?
It seems not, though Damascius is probably not entirely consistent in this judgment; I'd say it's a consequence of his "upgrading" the status of intellect. Alternatively, one could say that it is a function of the almost para-intelligible status of the Unified as ontôs on. Note that Damascius posits theological coordinates both for the third moment of the 1st intelligible triad and for the third triad. He also seems to find a distinct agency in the intelligible object, a desire-to-be-known which (ironically?) may prevent seamless knowledge of it by the intellect.
